Kennedy summoned his closest advisers to explore options and lead an approach for the United States that would resolve the crisis. Some advisers – including all joint chiefs of staff – have called for an airstrike to destroy the missiles, followed by an American invasion of Cuba; Others called for harsh warnings against Cuba and the Soviet Union. The president opted for an average course. On 22 October, he ordered a naval “quarantine” of Cuba. The use of “quarantine” legally distinguished this action from a blockade that implied the existence of a state of war; The use of “quarantine” instead of “blockade” has also enabled the United States to secure the support of the Organization of American States. Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, wrote a position paper that helped Kennedy distinguish between the so-called “quarantine”[66] of offensive weapons and the blocking of all materials, stating that a conventional blockade was not the original intent. As it was to take place in international waters, Kennedy obtained the agreement of the OAS for military actions under the hemispheric provisions of the defense of the Treaty of Rio: Khrushchev had complicated relations with the West. As a staunch supporter of communism, he nevertheless favoured peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries. Unlike Stalin, he even visited the United States. Relations between the two superpowers deteriorated somewhat in 1960, when the Soviets shot down an American U-2 spy plane deep within their territory. The following year, Khrushchev authorized the construction of the Berlin Wall to prevent the East Germans from fleeing to capitalist West Germany.

Historian William Cohn argued in a 1976 article that television programs are typically the main source used by the American public to know and interpret the past. [164] According to historian Andrei Kosovo, the Soviet media proved somewhat disorganized because they were unable to produce a coherent popular history. Khrushchev lost power and was cleansed of history. Cuba was no longer presented as a heroic David against the American Goliath. A contradiction that permeated the Soviet media campaign was between the pacifist rhetoric of the pacifist movement, which highlights the horrors of nuclear war, and the militancy of the need to prepare the Soviets for war against American aggression. [165] On October 26 at 13:00 EDT, ABC News` John A. Scali had lunch with Alexander Feklisov, KGB station manager in Washington, D.C., at Fomin`s request. On the orders of the PCUS Politburo,[92] Fomin said, “War seems to be breaking out.” He asked Scali to use his contacts to talk to his “high-ranking friends” at the State Department to see if the U.S. would be interested in a diplomatic solution. He suggested that the language of the agreement included the Soviet Union`s assurance that it would withdraw arms under UN supervision and that Castro would publicly announce that he would not accept such weapons in exchange for a us-by-law statement saying they would not invade Cuba. [93] The United States responded by asking the Brazilian government to send Castro a message that the United States “would have no chance of invading” if the missiles were withdrawn.

[76] Popular American media, especially television, have often benefited from the events of the missile crisis and both fictional and documentary forms. [161] Jim Willis cites the crisis as one of the 100 “media moments that changed America.” [162] Sheldon Stern finds that half a century later, there are still many “misunderstandings, half-truths and blatant lies” that have marked the media`s versions of what happened during those two upsetting weeks in the White House. [163] After several days of tense negotiations, an agreement was reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev.